Introduction
Large trading losses reported from derivative transactions by banks (and their corporate clients) has heightened public interest concerning the role of banking institutions in derivative transactions. The debate centers around two issues. The first issue is whether bank clients are adequately informed (and protected) about the nature of the risk involved with these transactions.
The second issue is how derivative transactions affect the level of a bank's overall risk exposure --with derivatives constituting a potential source of increased solvency exposure.
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From the standpoint of a bank's management (and accountants), derivatives are regarded as off-balance sheet items despite their importance as a source of profit and risk.
2 Derivative contracts, however, are different from traditional off-balance sheet activities such as letters of credits and loan commitments. One difference is the payoffs from these contracts are dependent on an underlying primary market asset. That is, a derivative contract is an innovated product whose value is derived from a primary product. Hence, the characteristic of the primary market 1 Institutions reported to have big losses from derivative transactions recently include Gibson Greetings, Procter and Gamble, Bankers Trust, Kidder Peabody, Baring Securities (U.K.), Daiwa (Japan), Metallgesellschaft AG (Germany) and Orange County (California), For responses from policymakers to better monitor and regulate derivative transactions, see Wall Street Journal, "SEC is seeking data on firm's derivative risk," (5/24/94); "New capital proposals will push banks to better reflect risks of derivatives," (9/2/94); and "New guidelines to toughen monitoring of derivatives transactions by banks, " (10/24/94). The Fortune magazine also has an article, "Untangling the derivative mess" (3/20/95). 2 Recognizing this feature of contingent contracts, Diamond (1984) argues that a bank's participation in offbalance sheet activities is a means of diversifying its asset portfolios. Kane and Unal (1990) similarly characterize the off-balance sheet activities as a "hidden capital" of the bank.
product --outside the bank --directly affects the value of derivatives held by the bank. Traditional off-balance sheet products in contrast, do not derive from an external primary product in the market, but rather are contingent on the bank's willingness to grant loans or credits. The products also differ in terms of the interest rate and exchange rate exposures they entail.
evidenced by their popularity as a risk management and trading tool, derivatives directly two As affect a bank's interest rate and exchange risk profile. Loan commitments and letters of credit, on the other hand, are more directly related to a bank's credit risk exposure rather than interest rate and exchange rate risk exposures as such.
This paper examines how derivative transactions have affected the interest rate and exchange rate risk exposures of banking firms. An emerging literature on off-balance sheet banking has investigated the effect of traditional off-balance activities on bank operations and risk, without focusing on derivatives and their impact on interest rate and exchange rate risks specifically.
3 While a few authors, such as Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992) and Grammatikos, Saunders and Swary (1986) , have examined the sensitivity of bank returns and profits to interest rate and exchange rate risks through traditional on-balance sheet bank operations, we are unaware of any study that examines the joint effect on a bank's interest rate and exchange rate risk exposures due to off-balance sheet derivative contracts. 4 This paper uses monthly data, from January 1975 to December 1992, for fifty-nine large U. S. banks to estimate the effect of offbalance sheet derivative exposures, as well as on-balance sheet exposures, on interest rate and exchange rate risks --while recognizing the jointly determined nature of these risks. The results of this study provide the first formal estimates of the joint effect of derivative systematic interest rate and exchange rate risks of U. S. banks.
exposures on the The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes estimation methods. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a summary.
Theoretical Framework
The basic model used in this paper is a three-factor model:
where R it is an excess rate of return of stock i over the risk-free rate q at time t, R mt is an excess rate of return on market portfolio over the risk-free rate, r t is the interest rate risk factor measured by the percentage rate of changes in risk-free rate, i.e., (q t -q t-1 )/q t-l when q is three-month U.S.
Treasury bill rate, and e t is the exchange rate risk factor measured by the percentage rate of change in currency exchange rate, i.e., (f t -f t-1 )/f t-l when f is the value of the U. S. dollar against a basket of foreign currencies. Although we take the multifactor model as given, it is still necessary to provide a concrete meaning to risk betas.
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Consider a U.S. bank that has a net basic balance-sheet exposure of B i and a net derivative off-balance sheet exposure of D i , with respect to both interest rate and exchange rate risks. 6 The return on stocks, R i , can be restated as: (2) measurement errors. Note that equation (2) is in vector form, summarizing the sensitivity of stock returns with respect to both basic balance sheet and derivative off-balance sheet exposures to interest rate and exchange rate risk measures.
In equation (l), the standard definition of market risk beta is
By applying similar definitions for interest rate and exchange rate risk betas and substituting (2) for R i , we obtain:
and (5) , and Dumas and Solnik (1995) . For inclusion of both factors, see Grammatikos, Saunders and Swary (1986) , Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992) , Bartnov and Bodnar (1994) , and Prasad and Rajan (1995) .
It is useful to examine the nature of these covariances in more detail. To this end, suppose beginning of the period. The bank's net asset at the end of the period in dollar terms is (6) where q and q* are interest rate levels for domestic and foreign-currency denominated default risk-free assets respectively, g = l/f is the end-of-the period domestic-currency value of a unit of foreign currency. The interest rate levels, q and q*, at time t are certain (known and default riskfree) but their dynamic rates of change over time, r and r*, are stochastic. The exchange rate, g, as well as its rate of change, x, is stochastic.
Note the identity,
in the market value of a bank's net asset equals expected rate of return on its stocks. Hence, we can express the expected stock return as: Derivatives are used by banks (for their own account or for clients) as an instrument of hedging as well as trading (or speculation). When a derivative is used for hedging purpose, its use will likely increase with the amount of the basic on-balance sheet exposure to be hedged.
However, no such relation is expected when a derivative is used for trading or speculation.
addition, a bank's use of derivatives depends on learning and adaptation. When a bank has In introduced and adapted an innovated product in its risk management practice, the use of that product is likely to increase up to a point as the bank tries to exploit its capability in all risk reducing (hedging) and return-increasing (speculation or trading) banking functions. Thus, for a major commercial bank that uses derivatives for hedging and/or trading, we would expect related covariances can also be stated in terms of underlying state variables. A formal specification of these covariances, however, is difficult because of the complex payoff structure of various contingent claims.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the linkage between a bank's systematic risk and its use of off-balance derivative transactions, and equations (4) and (5) provide that linkage. The two equations indicate that the interest rate and exchange rate risk betas are a function of both the firm's basic balance sheet exposure and derivative off-balance sheet exposures, while the subsequent discussion addresses the sources of these exposures. Moreover, they also reveal that the interest rate and exchange rate betas are interdependent, which suggests that some sort of simultaneous framework is appropriate to estimate bank-specific determinants of betas. 
Estimation Methods and Data
We utilize monthly data from January 1975 to December 1992 for 59 large U.S. bank holding companies. The estimation proceeds in two steps: first, we estimate the beta coefficients for each bank using time series data and equation (l), and second, we estimate the bank-specific determinants of interest rate and exchange rate risk betas based on cross sectional bank-specific exposure data and equations (4)-(5). This two-step estimation method is consistent with the method used by Fama and French (1992) . 8 However, to adjust for possible bias due to crossequation dependencies, the return equations in each group are estimated as a simultaneous equation system, using a modified Seemingly Unrelated Technique (SUR). The modified SUR technique, due to Chamberlain (1982) and Macurdy (1981a, 198lb) , is a variation of the standard SUR method and produces asymptotically efficient estimates without imposing either conditional homoskedasticity or serial independence restrictions on disturbance terms. the monetary deregulation that became effective in January
One issue in estimating a multi-factor index model of the type proposed by eq. (1) is whether actual or orthogonalized variables should be employed as independent variables. While risk factors can be easily orthogonalized by running a side regression, Giliberto (1985) has shown that such orthogonalization may also introduce bias. Accordingly, in this study we use actual changes for interest rate risk and exchange rate risk variables. Since we use changes, not levels, the correlations among independent variables are actually quite low (see Table 1 for the description and correlation of these variables). If the market is informationally efficient, changes in interest rates and exchange rates are likely to be largely unexpected.
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In the second step, the interest rate and exchange rate betas generated in the first stage are regressed against bank-specific on and off-balance sheet exposure variables. Bank-specific data are extracted from the Federal Reserve's Call Report tapes published by the National Technical Information System. Banks with missing balance sheet variables are dropped from estimation in the second step. This reduces the sample size in the second step to 50 banks. The cross sectional estimation is based on bank-specific data for 1992. In this step, too, interest rate and exchange rate beta equations are estimated as a system using the modified SUR to improve efficiency of the estimates. While we would ideally need a more disaggregated data than those provided in Table 1 (e.g., the breakdown of a bank's positions and derivatives by currency and by detailed category), such data are not available from the Call Report tapes at this time.
simultaneous function of bank-specific basic balance sheet and derivative off-balance sheet exposures. The simultaneous estimation accounts for biases arising from interactions between interest rates and exchange rates, as well as the dependence between bank-specific variables. The estimable equation system can be specified as 9 We also ran some preliminary estimation of orthogonalized variables, but the results are basically similar.
(9)
Note that, as in the estimation of betas in the first step, the estimation of (9) is simultaneous because the balance sheet and derivative exposure variables affect both the interest rate and exchange rate betas. The modified SUR procedure enables us to incorporate the interaction of the two exposure equations as a system. Banks are classified into three groups based on asset size. Estimation was also performed for a sub-period of 1981-92 to see whether the similar patterns hold intertemporally.
Empirical Results

(a) Estimation of Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Risk Exposure Coefficients
Estimation results for the entire sample period of [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] indicate that the market risk beta is statistically significant (at five percent level on two-tail test) for all 59 individual banks and for all bank groups. The interest rate risk beta, however, is significant for only 23 banks out of 59, although significant for all three bank groups at ten percent level. The exchange risk beta is significant for a majority of banks (49 out of 59) and for all bank groups except for the third 10 Note that we could further nest the estimating equation by substituting, in (4) and (5), equations in footnote 7
covariances of state variables r and e. We do not pursue this here because we wish to estimate betas as a function of bank-specific exposures rather than underlying state variables.
group. While more banks have significant exchange rate risk betas than interest rate risk betas, the interest rate risk betas that are significant are all negative, while the signs of the significant exchange rate risk betas are divided: for a total of 49 significant exchange rate coefficients, 14 are positive while 35 are negative. The result on exchange rate coefficient reflects different exchange exposures (positive or negative net basic exposed asset and cash flow positions as well as exposed derivative contracts), as well as different sensitivity to a given exposure, of individual banks. 11 The fact that exchange rate coefficients are more significant than interest rate coefficients shows the relative importance of these exposures for individual banks. Such implication, however, may not be transferable to government policymakers who are more interested in the banking system as a whole rather than an individual bank. Unlike the interest rate betas that all have the same sign, the exchange rate betas have different signs for different banks. Therefore the potential for risk reduction at the system level is greater for exchange risk than interest rate risk. Table 2 also shows a differing pattern of betas for different groups of banks. The market risk beta, for the entire sample period, is highest for the first group of largest 20 banks, followed by the second and the third group after that. This pattern of correspondence between bank size and market risk beta is interesting and at odds with the popular notion that a smaller firm has a higher risk. The magnitude of the interest rate risk betas by group indicates a mild inverted U shape, with the highest absolute values shown in the second group rather than in the highest or lowest bank group. Since the largest banks are likely to be dealers rather than end users, they may use dealer activities to limit risk. An alternative explanation is that they have better risk management. However, there is no appreciable relation between bank group size and exchange risk, in terms of either the magnitude of coefficients or the number of significant coefficients.
To examine the intertemporal stability of beta coefficients, the same return equation period. We examine the switch from a strong dollar to a weak dollar period. The foreign currency value of the U. S. dollar has increased very steeply for the period of January 1981 to March 1985 (prior to the signing of the Plaza Accord), followed by a period of equally steep decline and stagnation (April 1985 -December 1992 . The exchange rate regime dummies used are 1 (strong dollar period), 2 (weak dollar period), and 0 (the rest of the sample period). The three-way dummies imply that the resulting coefficients should be interpreted qualitatively rather than numerically. Dummies are introduced in both the intercept and the slope of interest rate and exchange rate betas.
Estimation results with dummies are summarized in Table 3 than uniformly for all banks. It is possible that banks were subject to market transition shocks for a more extended period of time, say, from 1979 to 1982 [Yourougou (1990) ]. However, the weaker result of the January 1981 dummy than the October 1979 dummy discounts such a possibility. Using a data-based methodology, Kane and Unal (1990) Similarly, 5 and 3 banks in the third group are sensitive to the strong dollar and weak dollar dummies respectively, compared to 4 and 2 banks for respective exchange rate regimes in the first group. Although these results with respect to bank groups are not overwhelming, they support the notion that bigger banks are generally less susceptible to external policy shocks than smaller banks because of their superior hedging efficiency with respect to derivatives. This is also consistent with the finding of Gunther and Siems (1995) who report a positive relationship between derivative activities and the size of bank capitalization. Table 4 provides a description of firm-specific balance sheet and derivative exposure variables used in the second-step cross-sectional estimation. The cross-sectional estimation is based on equations (4) and (5) Correlations among independent variables used in the second-step estimation are presented in Table 5 . Correlations among basic exposure variables are generally low (less than 0.40), but correlations among derivative exposure variables are generally high (higher than 0.80). .
(b) Bank-Specific Determinants of Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Risk Betas
Correlations between derivative contracts of similar kinds (e.g., options versus swaps, or interest rate options versus and currency options) are also high. The use of one form of a derivative contract often appears to be accompanied by the use of another. From a statistical point, this
implies that the coefficient of an individual derivative variable is potentially subject to multicollinearity. Therefore derivative variables were included selectively. In rate and exchange rate beta equations were estimated as a system to capture addition, the interest the joint influences of these derivative variables. Thus, regardless of any question on an individual coefficient given the complementary nature of these products, a meaningful inference can still be made for the effect of derivative contracts as a group.
Parenthetically, it is interesting that all basic and derivative variables are positively (but imperfectly) correlated. This is consistent with a notion that banks use derivatives partially for hedging purposes. However, the correlations are higher for a pair of currency variables than interest rate variables. This indicates that derivatives are more commonly used (for hedging) for currency risk than the interest rate risk.
The results of the second-step cross-sectional estimation regarding the determinants of interest rate and exchange rate risk betas are presented in Table 6 . This estimation procedure permits simultaneous interactions between interest rate and exchange risk exposure variables. The result for the interest rate risk beta in the first panel indicates a mixed picture with respect to the significance of a bank's basic financial statement variables. As expected, it is shown that a bank's mortgage exposure is a significant determinant of its interest rate risk beta. However, the amount of a bank's fixed rate loan portfolio (as a percentage of total asset) is not. This may be attributable to the fact that large U.S. banks are hedged against interest rate risk. However, we have seen in Table 5 that the correlations between basic interest rate exposure variables and interest rate derivatives are generally small (ranging from 0.21 to 0.42). Overall this may indicate that the interest rate risk hedging by banks is principally done by fundamental balance sheet management (e.g., securitization of fixed rate assets) rather than the usual off-balance sheet interest rate derivatives.
In contrast to the mixed result of basic balance sheet or income statement variables, it is noteworthy that the derivative exposure variables are generally significant overall. The interest rate options bought or sold are significant for all four models. The bank's commitments to interest rate forwards and futures are also significant for two out of the four models estimated. The interest rate swaps do not appear to have an independently significant effect on the bank's interest rate betas. However, the pattern of interactions among the interest rate derivative contracts seen above suggests a strong likelihood that the interest rate derivative contracts as a group has a significant impact on the bank's interest rate beta.
Bank-specific exposure variables have even stronger effect on exchange rate risk betas in Table 6 . Traditional basic exchange exposure variables reported in the bank's balance sheet or income statement --such as foreign asset ratios, foreign interest and non-interest expense ratios --are shown to be all significant at least at the ten percent level (two-tail test). That is, a rise in a bank's foreign asset or foreign interest expense reduces a bank's domestic currency exposure coefficient or raises its foreign currency exposure coefficient. (Note that the exchange rate variable, e, is the rate of appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the basket of foreign currency so that a reduction in domestic currency exposure coefficient implies an increase in foreign currency exposure coefficient.) Foreign non-interest expense ratios, however, reduce its foreign currency exposure, indicating a possibility that non-interest expenses serve, operationally, as a means of diversification or hedging against foreign exchange risk.
A striking finding in table 6 is the result on currency derivative contracts. Major currency derivative contracts --such as currency options bought, currency forwards and futures, and currency swaps --are shown to have a significant effect at the five percent level. Moreover, they all have a negative coefficient, i.e., an increased exposure to these contracts by the bank leads to a decrease in domestic currency (dollar) risk or an increase in foreign currency risk. As expected, currency options sold, however, have a significant positive coefficient. The significant coefficients of currency derivative contracts compare with significant yet somewhat qualified effects of interest rate derivative variables.
In sum, we have established the connection between derivative activities and a bank's interest rate and exchange rate risks in a framework that permits simultaneity across banks and across risk categories. The influence of currency derivatives, however, is generally more pronounced than that of interest rate derivative contracts. Thus the foreign exchange market appears to be more important than the domestic money market for large U.S. banks as a source of potential systematic risk, and reward, originating from derivative products. However, the lack of more disaggregated data on currency positions and derivative holdings confounds our analysis. In addition, we did not address the issue of why derivatives are used.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has estimated the interest rate risk and exchange rate risk betas of 59 large U.S. commercial banks for the period of January 1975 to December 1992 in a multifactor model framework. The estimation procedure uses a modified seemingly unrelated simultaneous method that adjusts for cross-equation dependencies as well as heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Using this method, the estimation is carried out in two steps. First, the interest rate risk and exchange rate risk betas are estimated for individual banks, and second, the betas are estimated as a function of bank-specific basic and derivative exposure variables. The equations are estimated as a system in both steps, to capture, respectively, the cross-bank dependencies and the joint influences of interest rate and exchange rate exposure variables.
The result of the first step estimation shows that the exchange rate risk betas are generally more significant than the interest rate risk betas. In addition, there are significant variations in interest rate and exchange rate risk betas across banks and across periods. We interpret this as a result of different exposure positions of banks. Changes in market conditions due to external policy shocks similarly have differential influences on bank risk and stock returns. Insofar as the derivatives are concerned, however, the currency market is more important as a source of systematic uncertainty (and more attention is needed) than the domestic money market.
It is true that exchange rate betas often have different signs across banks and thus leave room for risk reduction for the banking system as a whole while the interest rate betas have the same sign.
Still, the systematic exchange risk is significant for the system as well as individual banks, and currency derivatives are important sources of such risk. An interesting issue left for future work is whether and how derivative exposures influence a bank's default risk. In addition, the future work must ascertain the differential effects of more disaggregated bank-specific data and address the issue of why derivatives are used. 
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